A difficult diagnosis : the shortage of affordable malpractice insurance in West Virginia and elsewhere won't be easy to solve by Charles Gerena
W
hen malpractice insurance
premiums started rising in
W est Virginia three years ago,
doctors had few options. They could either
find a way to lower their premiums or quit.
Medical professionals throughout
West Virginia made some tough
choices. City Hospital in Martinsburg
closed its psychiatric unit, and hospi-
tals in Putnam and Jackson counties
shuttered their obstetrics units. Blue-
field Regional Medical Center in south-
ern West Virginia stopped performing
angioplasties and open-heart surgeries.
“Obstetrics, orthopedics, neuro-
surgery, and general surgery are among
the highest-risk medical fields,”
describes Tony Gregory, director of com-
munications for the West Virginia Hos-
pital Association. Since they are riskier,
“they produce the most medical liabil-
ity suits,” and their practitioners pay the
highest premiums. At the same time,
reduced reimbursements from govern-
mental payers have resulted in less
revenue to offset premium increases.
Shortages of affordable malpractice
insurance have occurred throughout
the United States, with critical short-
falls in at least 12 states, including West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Nevada, and Mississippi. This problem
is merely one symptom of larger issues
facing insurers and a range of health
care providers, from physicians to den-
tists to nursing homes.
R
eports of doctors marching in
front of government buildings
and patients crossing state lines
in search of care seem unprecedented.
In fact, malpractice shortages occurred
twice in the last 30 years. 
An insurance company makes
money in two ways, and both income
sources are vulnerable to economic
cycles.  First, it achieves an underwrit-
ing profit, or loss, based on the differ-
ence between the premiums it collects
and the expense of servicing policies,
which includes claims paid and other
administrative costs. 
Second, the insurer can earn income
to offset an underwriting loss by invest-
ing premiums in stocks, bonds, and
other appreciable assets. “If an insurer
knows that the payout is five or six
years from now and it has certain
administrative costs, it has to decide
what to do with that money in the
meantime,” explains economist Frank
Sloan of Duke University. 
During the mid-1970s and mid-1980s,
malpractice insurers faced poor invest-
ment returns. They also had more claims.
According to economist Patricia Danzon
of the University of Pennsylvania, the fre-
quency of malpractice claims per 100
doctors jumped 10 percent annually
between 1975 and 1985. During these
“hard markets,” insurers had to adjust
other variables in their revenue-expense
equation to maintain profitability. Pre-
miums increased and requirements tight-
ened for policyholders.
Many malpractice premiums dropped
or increased modestly during the 1990s,
until signs of a hard market emerged in
the latter part of the decade. Under-
writing losses started rising as claims out-
paced premiums. Insurers say they were
adrift in the choppy waters of tort law,
which compensates injured patients and
serves as a deterrent against future acts
of malpractice.
“If an insurer has the perception that
there is a lot of uncertainty with respect
to judgments … it doesn’t know how to
price the coverage,” says Sloan. The firm
could raise premiums or concentrate on
other lines that are less volatile.
According to the West Virginia
A Difficult Diagnosis
The shortage of affordable malpractice insurance in
West Virginia and elsewhere won’t be easy to solve.
BY CHARLES GERENAHospital Association, several insurers
merged or left the state in the early to
mid-1990s, and a major carrier declared
insolvency in 1997.
The picture was just as cloudy nation-
wide, recalls Andrea Wood, spokesper-
son for The St. Paul Companies, formerly
one of the nation’s largest malpractice
insurers. But firms like St. Paul believed
they had enough reinsurance and good
investment returns to carry them
through to better days.
T
he new millennium brought two
major shocks to the insurance
market that quickly made matters
worse for malpractice insurers. The Sept.
11 terrorist attacks caused many primary
insurers to pay more for reinsurance and to
increase their reserves for covering claims.
Also, three straight years of stock market
declines that began in 2000 evaporated
insurers’ investment returns. 
Given the hardening of the malprac-
tice insurance market, something had to
change. Premiums jumped nationwide
starting in 2000.
Not only did malpractice insurance
become pricier, it also was hard to find.
Many small insurers had such low
reserves that they ceased operations,
including PHICO Insurance Co. in
Pennsylvania. A few large insurers
stopped offering malpractice coverage,
including The St. Paul Companies. “We
determined that even with the double-
digit rate increases that we’re working
on getting approved, we wouldn’t be
able to maintain profitability in that
line of business,” explains Wood.
In the Fifth District, some doctors
in the Carolinas lost their malpractice
coverage, but they had alternatives. A
physician-owned mutual insurance
company covers half of North Car-
olina’s doctors in private practice, while
a state-operated Patients’ Compensa-
tion Fund provides excess coverage for
more than three-quarters of South Car-
olina’s private physicians. Still, mal-
practice insurance costs a lot more in
both states and elsewhere in the region.
With an already limited supply of
insurers, the Mountain State has been
hit hard by the lack of affordable mal-
practice coverage. St. Paul’s departure
was devastating since the company
insured about one-third of the state’s
doctors. Then the withdrawal of a
smaller firm, OHIC Insurance, in
2002 added insult to injury. Only one
major malpractice provider remains,
Medical Assurance, and its policy stan-
dards are tighter.
Now, the malpractice market is nar-
rower and more selective. Eugene
Pawlowski, president of Bluefield
Regional, says that just one lawsuit can
cause a doctor to lose coverage, and
then it’s difficult to find another
provider. “Smaller communities in West
Virginia don’t have the alternatives that
bigger states like Virginia and North
Carolina have.”
Why are fewer insurers willing to
do business in West Virginia? Some
observers blame the state’s reputation
as a haven for litigation, due to its rel-
atively lax tort system and sympathetic
juries. While such a link is hard to
prove, data from the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank suggest that the state
stands out. The number of malpractice
payments in West Virginia rose from
8.1 to 11.5 per 100,000 people between
1995 and 2001, while the rest of the
Fifth District had far fewer payments
per capita (see graph at right).
Perhaps West Virginia’s relatively
unhealthy population makes it an expen-
sive market to serve. The state’s mortal-
ity rate for heart disease was 22 percent
higher than the national average in 2000,
the cancer rate was 14 percent higher,
and the rate for chronic lower respira-
tory disease was 44 percent higher.
To  make sure that West Virginians
have access to health care, state law-
makers approved a temporary mal-
practice insurance plan during a special
session in December 2001. Physicians
can be insured for up to $1 million by
the state’s Board of Risk and Insurance
Management (BRIM), which provides
general liability coverage for state agen-
cies, county and municipal govern-
ments, and nonprofit organizations. 
Nearly 1,100 doctors and 12 hospi-
tals have purchased malpractice insur-
ance from BRIM so far. While BRIM’s
base rate was 5 percent lower than the
commercial rate in West Virginia in late
January, premiums still were higher for
certain specialties like neurosurgery. 
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Drs. Elizabeth Spangler, Kenneth Wright, and Michael Fidler speak with Senate Minority
Leader Vic Sprouse (center) about West Virginia’s malpractice insurance crisis. 
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More Malpractice in the 
Mountain State?
The number of malpractice payments in West
Virginia rose modestly from 147 in 1995 to 207 in
2001. But these numbers tell another story when
taking the state’s population into account.
Compared to the rest of the Fifth District and the
United States, West Virginia’s payment experience
per 100,000 people is quite high.
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NOTE: Per capita figures calculated using population estimates,
except for actual Census count for 2000.
SOURCES: National Practitioner Data Bank, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services; U.S. Census Bureau
1995 1998 2001
Number of Medical Malpractice Payment
Reports, Per 100,000Costs for malpractice coverage are
still high, argue tort reform advocates,
because not enough has been done to
reduce the frequency and size of tort
claims. In his State of the State speech
in January, Gov. Bob Wise proposed
several reforms to address this concern.
His recommendations included a base
cap of $250,000 for pain and suffering
and other noneconomic damages and
a limit of $500,000 for damages
against trauma care providers. Wise
also proposed creating a three-year, $20
million fund to offset premiums paid
by doctors in the BRIM program. (See
sidebar above for a summary of Wise’s
proposals and similar reforms proposed
by President Bush.)
I
n response to malpractice insurance
shortages during the 1970s and 1980s,
some states modified their tort law.
Did these changes lead to more affordable
coverage? According to a report by the U.S.
Congress’ Office of Technology Assess-
ment, only caps on damage awards were
consistently effective. 
Tort reform hasn’t been the cure-all
some had imagined. That’s because
damage awards account for just part of
a malpractice insurer’s expenses. When
setting premiums, an insurer must
factor in the price of reinsurance, the
administrative costs of investigating
claims, and lawyers’ fees for defending
claims in court.
Therefore, buyers and sellers in the
malpractice insurance market also must
find solutions to the current shortage.
Some hospitals have started self-insur-
ing. Bluefield Regional uses its own
money to cover the first $5 million in
claims, and reinsurance from AP Capital
to pay for claims above that amount.
So far, the hospital has succeeded in
providing insurance at cheaper rates
than BRIM. “I have better risks,” notes
Pawlowski. “The state takes the bad
doctors with the good doctors. I’m just
taking the good doctors.” 
But not all hospitals will be able to
afford to do this. Some medical pro-
fessionals will probably have to face the
choice of paying more for malpractice
insurance, retiring early, or moving out
of the state.
If history is any guide, though, the
overall ranks of the medical profession
will continue to swell. Despite past
spikes in malpractice premiums,
America’s supply of doctors has steadily
grown from 366,000 in 1975 to 750,000
in 2001. So far, a sense of purpose and
the promise of profits seem to have
outweighed the increasing cost of
doing business. RF
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In January, West Virginia Gov. Bob Wise and President Bush proposed tort reform plans. Here’s how they stack up.
Proposed by Proposed by Adopted in
Reform Explanation  Gov. Wise? Pres. Bush? 5th District
Limit non- Awards for pain and suffering are capped; exceptions for cases of YESa,d YES YES
economic damages wrongful death and gross negligence are often made (MD, VA, WV)
Limit Awards to compensate plaintiffs in excess of actual damages are NO YES YES
punitive damages capped; commonly used to punish defendants for reckless misconduct (NC, VA)
and deter others
Eliminate joint-and- Defendant is not liable for paying the entire judgment, but only for YESb,d YES YES
several liability his/her share of responsibility for an injury (DC)c
Change collateral Damages can be reduced by all or part of the value of lost wages or YESd YES NO
source rule medical bills paid by third parties, including workers’ compensation
and health insurers
Permit periodic Instead of a lump sum, damages can be disbursed over time; this is NO YES YES 
payment of damages typically done through an annuity that pays out periodically (DC, MD, VA)
a Gov. Wise proposed lower noneconomic damages from a cap of $1 million to a base cap of $250,000, with a sliding scale based on severity of injury.
b Joint-and-several liability rules were relaxed somewhat in West Virginia in 1986. Doctors are liable for the entire judgment only when their share of responsibility exceeds 25 percent. 
c In the District of Columbia, liability for punitive damages is apportioned by relative fault.
d Proposal included in legislation passed by General Assembly in March 2003.
SOURCES: “State Laws Chart: Liability Reforms,” American Medical Association, April 2002; “Summary of Medical Malpractice Law,” McCullough, Campbell & Lane, 1998; “State Laws on Medical Liability,” American Tort
Reform Association Web site, 1994
Fixing the Tort System